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1 Introduction
The tick size is the smallest increment between two consecutive prices on a trading instrument. It is
fixed by the exchange or regulator and typically depends on both the price of the asset and the traded
volume, see [16, 18]. It is a crucial parameter of market microstructure and its value is often subject of
debates: a too small tick size leads to very frequent price changes whereas a too large tick size prevents
the price from moving freely according to the investor’s views. In this article, we focus on so-called
large tick assets, that is assets for which the spread is most of the time equal to one tick. Such assets
represent a large number of financial products, especially in Europe since MIFID II regulation, see [18].
The tick size has a major influence on the ecosystem of financial markets, in particular on the activity
of high frequency traders. Being usually considered as market makers, these agents are the main liq-
uidity providers for most heavily traded financial assets. This means that they propose prices at which
they are ready to buy (bid price) and sell (ask price) units of financial products. In [13], the authors
investigate the behavior of high frequency traders with respect to the relative tick size, which is defined
as the ratio between the tick size and the price level. One of their findings is that everything else equal,
stocks with a lower relative tick size attract a greater proportion of high frequency traders, see also
[10, 19]. This is because they can rapidly marginally adjust their quotes to seize price priority. In the
case of a large tick asset, speed is still an important feature as market participants have to compete
for queue priority in the order book, see [17, 20].
Market makers (typically high frequency traders) face a complex optimization problem: making money
out of the bid-ask spread (the difference between the bid and ask prices) while mitigating the inventory
risk associated to price changes. This problem is usually addressed via stochastic control theory tools,
see for example [2, 7, 8, 14, 15]. In classical market making models, the so-called efficient price, which
represents the market consensus on the value of the asset at a given time, around which the market
maker posts his quotes, is a continuous semi-martingale. The quotes of the market maker are continu-
ous in terms of price values and not necessarily multiple of the tick size. However, in actual financial
markets, transaction prices are obviously lying on the discrete tick grid. This discreteness of prices is
a key feature which cannot be neglected at the high frequency scale since it plays a fundamental role
in the design of market making strategies in practice. To get a more realistic market making model,
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one therefore needs to build a relevant continuous-time price dynamic with discrete state space to take
into account this very important microstructural property of the asset.
To this end, we borrow the framework of the model with uncertainty zones introduced in [21, 22]. In
this model, transaction prices are discrete and the current transaction price is modified only when the
underlying continuous efficient price process crosses some predetermined zones. In our approach, we
also consider that there exists an efficient price that market participants have in mind when making
their trading decisions. Based on this efficient price, market participants build “fair” bid and “fair”
ask prices. These two prices are lying on the tick grid and represent the views of market participants
on reasonable and tradable values for buying and selling, regardless of any inventory constraint. In our
setting, depending on his views and his inventory constraint, the market maker chooses whether or not
to quote a constant volume at these fair bid and ask prices. This is a stylized viewpoint as in practice
the market maker will probably quote a larger spread rather than not quoting at all. The market
maker increases (resp. decreases) his current “fair” bid price if the efficient price becomes “sufficiently”
higher (resp. lower) than his current fair bid price and similarly for the ask side. The mechanism to
determine whether the efficient price is sufficiently higher (resp. lower) than the current price is that
of the model with uncertainty zones, described in Section 2.
Usual market making models include a symmetric running penalty for the inventory process, often
defined as φ
∫ T
0 Q
2
tdt where Qt is the inventory of the market maker at time t ∈ [0, T ], φ > 0 is a risk
aversion parameter and T is the end of the trading period. It is well-known, see for example [1], that
for regulatory and operational reasons, market participants and especially market makers are reluctant
to have a short inventory at the end of the trading day. This is mainly due to constraints imposed by
the exchange/regulator and to the overnight repo rate that they have to pay. This asymmetry between
long and short terminal inventory of the market maker gives the intuition of the potential relevance of
some kind of asymmetry in the market design between buy and sell orders.
If some kind of asymmetry is implemented at the microstructure level, it can have important conse-
quences on the profit of exchanges, as it notably depends on the number of processed orders. Typical
ways to optimize the number of orders on platforms are the choice of relevant tick sizes and suitable
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fee schedules (which subsidize liquidity provision and tax liquidity consumption). In [12], the authors
highlight the importance of differentiating maker and taker fees in order to increase the trading rate. In
the more recent studies [3, 11], optimal make-take fees schedules are designed based on contract theory.
In this work, the asymmetry we consider is not between liquidity consumers and liquidity providers
but between buyers and sellers.
The goal of this paper is to show the possible benefits for an exchange in terms of liquidity provision
of side-specific tick sizes. To this end, we build an agent-based model where a high frequency market
maker acts on a large tick asset. The exchange is mitigating the activity on its platform by choosing
suitable tick sizes on the bid and ask sides. This means we have a different tick grid for buy and sell
orders. For given the tick sizes chosen by the exchange, we formulate the stochastic control problem
faced by the market maker who needs to maximize his Profit and Loss (PnL for short) while controlling
his inventory risk, taking into account asymmetry between short and long inventory. We show exis-
tence and uniqueness of a viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short) equation
associated to this problem. Then, we derive a quasi-closed form for the optimal controls of the market
maker (up to the value function). In particular, the role of the tick size in the decision of whether
or not to quote is explicit: essentially, a large tick size implies a large profit per trade for the market
maker but less market orders coming from market takers, and conversely.
Next, we solve the optimization problem of the exchange which can select optimal tick sizes knowing
the associated trading response of the market maker. In our model, the exchange earns a fixed fee when
a transaction occurs. Therefore, its remuneration is related to the quality of the liquidity provided by
the market maker on its platform. Numerical results show that side-specific tick sizes are more suitable
than symmetric ones both for the market maker and the exchange. The former is able to trigger more
alternations in the sign of market orders, which is beneficial both for spread pocketing and inventory
management (in contrast with the case where sequences of buy orders are followed by sequences of sell
orders). The latter increases the number of transactions on its platform. We also show that a tick size
asymmetry can offset short inventory constraints, therefore increasing the gains of both the market
maker and the exchange.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a reminder on the model with uncertainty
zones and explain how we revisit it for market making purposes. The market maker and exchange’s
problems are described in Section 3. We also state here our results about existence and uniqueness of a
viscosity solution associated to the control problem of the market maker and derive its optimal controls.
Finally, Section 4 is devoted to numerical results and their interpretations. Proofs are relegated to an
appendix.
2 The model with uncertainty zones
In this section, we provide a reminder on the model with uncertainty zones introduced in [21, 22], and
we adapt it to the framework of a market making problem with side-specific tick values. It is commonly
admitted that low frequency financial price data behave like a continuous Brownian semi-martingale.
However this is clearly not the case for high frequency data. The model with uncertainty zones repro-
duces sparingly and accurately the behavior of ultra high frequency transaction data of a large tick
asset. It is based on a continuous-time semi-martingale efficient price and a one dimensional parameter
η ∈ [0, 12 ]. The key idea of the model is that when a transaction occurs at some value on the tick grid,
the efficient price is close enough to this value at the transaction time. This proximity is measured
through the parameter η.
We define the efficient price (St)t∈[0,T ] on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P) where T is the trading
horizon. The logarithm of the efficient price (Yt)t∈[0,T ] is an Ft-adapted continuous Brownian semi-
martingale of the form
Yt = log(St) = log(S0) +
∫ t
0
asds+
∫ t
0
σs−dWs,
where W is an F -Brownian motion, and (σt)t∈[0,T ] is an F -adapted process with càdlàg paths and
(at)t∈[0,T ] is F -progressively measurable. Transaction prices lie on two fixed tick grids, defined by
{kαa, kαb} where αa (resp. αb) is the tick size on the ask (resp. bid) side and k ∈ N. For 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 12
and i ∈ {a, b}, we define the zone U ik = [0,∞)× (dik, uik) with
dik = (k +
1
2 − η
i)αi, uik = (k +
1
2 + η
i)αi. (2.1)
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Therefore Uak is a band of size 2ηaαa around the ask mid-tick grid value (k + 12)α
a and U bk is a band
of size 2ηbαb around the bid mid-tick grid value (k + 12)α
b. We call these bands the uncertainty zones.
The zones on the bid and ask sides are characterized by the parameters ηb, ηa which control the width
of the uncertainty zones. We will see in the next section how the fair bid and ask prices are deduced
from the efficient price dynamics across the uncertainty zones. In particular, the larger ηi, the farther
from the last traded price (on the bid or ask side) the efficient price has to be so that a price change
occurs. The idea behind the model with uncertainty zones is that, in some sense, market participants
feel more comfortable when the asset price is constant than when it is constantly moving. However,
there are times when the transaction price has to change because they consider that the last traded
price value is not reasonable anymore.
For sake of simplicity, we assume that transaction prices cannot jump by more than one tick. We also
define the time series of bid and ask transaction times leading to a price change as (τ bj , τaj )j≥0. The
last traded bid or ask price process is characterized by the couples of transaction times and transaction
prices with price changes (τj;P iτ ij )j≥0 where P
i
τ ij
= S(α
i)
τ ij
, the superscript (αi) denoting the rounding to
the nearest αi.
The dynamics of the (τ ij) will be described in Section 3. One can actually show that the efficient price
can be retrieved from transaction data using the equation
Sτ ij = S
(αi)
τ ij
− αi(12 − η
i)sgn
(
S
(αi)
τ ij
− S(αi)
τ ij−1
)
, i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ N.
This formula is particularly useful in order to derive ultra high frequency estimators of volatility and
covariation (see [22]). The parameters ηi can be estimated very easily. LetN (a)αi,t andN
(c)
αi,t be respectively
the number of alternations and continuations1 of one tick over the period [0, t]. Then, an estimator of
ηi over [0, t] is given by
ηˆαi,t =
N
(c)
αi,t
2N (a)αi,t
.
We refer to [21, 22] for further details on these estimation procedures. In this paper, we use the model
1An alternation/continuation corresponds to two consecutive price changes in the opposite/same direction.
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with uncertainty zones for market making purposes rather than for statistical estimation.
3 High frequency market making under side-specific tick val-
ues and interaction with the exchange
3.1 The market maker’s problem
We consider a high frequency marker maker acting on an asset whose efficient price St has the dynamics
dSt = σdWt,
where σ > 0 denotes the volatility of the asset. He uses the model with uncertainty zones described
earlier to materialize his views on the fair bid and ask prices. He increases (resp. decreases) his bid
price if the efficient price is “sufficiently” higher (resp. lower) than his current fair bid price. The
notion of “sufficiently” higher or lower is determined by the uncertainty zones parameters ηa, ηb, and
the tick sizes αa, αb. If ηa is small (resp. large), the market maker changes more (resp. less) frequently
his ask price, and similarly for the bid price with ηb. This leads to the following definition of fair bid
and ask prices of the market maker Sa, Sb:2
Sat = Sat− + αa1{St−Sa
t−>(
1
2+ηa)αa} − α
a1{St−Sa
t−<−(
1
2+ηa)αa},
Sbt = Sbt− + αb1{St−Sb
t−>(
1
2+ηb)αb} − α
b1{St−Sb
t−<−(
1
2+ηb)αb}.
Thus the fair bid (resp. ask) is modified when the efficient price is close enough to a new tradable price
on the tick grid with mesh αb (resp. αa).
Remark 3.1. Note that in the case αa = αb, ηa = ηb, the fair best bid is equal to the fair best ask. This
means that at a given time, a buy or sell order would be at the same price. In this situation, in our
stylized view, the market maker would probably quote only on one side (bid or ask). It is consistent with
the standard form of the model with uncertainty zones, where, at a given time, transactions can only
happen only on one side of the market, depending on the location of the efficient price. Still, the market
2Note that we can have situations where the bid price is above the ask price. However, recall that Sa and Sb are only
views about the fair bid and ask prices under the constraint that they have to lie on the tick grids.
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maker collects the spread from transactions occurring at different times as it is the case in practice.
We assume a constant volume of transaction equal to one. The market maker can choose to be present
or not for a transaction at the bid (with a price Sb) or at the ask (with a price Sa). The corresponding
cash process at terminal time T is given by
XT =
∫ T
0
(
Sat dNat − SbtdN bt
)
,
where the N it represent the number of transactions on the bid or ask side between 0 and t. In this
framework, the inventory of the market maker is given by Qt = N bt − Nat ∈ Q = [−q˜, q˜] where q˜ is
the risk limit of the market maker. For i ∈ {a, b}, the dynamics of N it is that of a point process with
intensity
λ(`it, Qt) :=
λ`it
1 + (καi)21{φ(i)Qt>−q}, φ(i) = 1{i=a} − 1{i=b}.
The process `it ∈ {0, 1} is the market maker’s control which lies in the set of F − predictable processes
with values in {0, 1} denoted by L. The parameter κ > 0 controls the sensitivity of the intensities to
αi, and λ > 0 is a scale parameter. When the market maker does not want to be present on the bid
(resp. ask side) at the price Sb (resp. Sa) he sets `b = 0 (resp. `a = 0) and conversely. In our large tick
asset setting, the situation where the market maker is not present is a simplified way to model the case
where the market maker’s quote is higher than the best possible limit. At a given time t ∈ [0, T ], when
`bt = 0 (resp `at = 0), the intensity of the point process N bt (resp. Nat ) is equal to zero so that there are
no incoming transactions. In addition to this, market takers are more confident to send market orders
when the tick size is small, as the market maker has more flexibility to adjust his bid and ask prices.3
This explains the decreasing shape of the intensities of market order arrivals from market takers with
respect to the tick size. The chosen parametric form for the intensities ensures no degenerate behavior
when the tick size gets close to zero.
The marked-to-market value of the market maker’s portfolio at time t is defined as QtSt. His optimiza-
3When the tick size is smaller, the market takers are more willing to trade. This does not necessarily lead to a higher
number of orders as it depends on the market maker’s presence.
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tion problem writes
sup
`∈L
E
[
XT +QT (ST − AQT )− φ
∫ T
0
Q2sds− φ−
∫ T
0
|Qs|21Qs<0ds
]
, (3.1)
where φ > 0 represents the risk-aversion parameter of the market maker, φ− > 0 is the additional risk
aversion of the market maker toward short position on [0, T ] and AQ2T , with A > 0, is a penalty term
for the terminal inventory position regardless of its sign. In this setting, the market maker wishes to
hold a terminal inventory close to zero because of the quadratic penalty AQ2T . The term φ
∫ T
0 Q
2
sds
penalizes long or short positions over the trading period. Problem (3.1) can of course be rewritten as
sup
`∈L
E
[
QT (ST − AQT ) +
∫ T
0
{
Sasλ(`as)− Sbsλ(`bs)− φQ2s − φ−Q2s1Qs<0
}
ds
]
.
We define the corresponding value function h defined on the open set
D =
{
(Sa, Sb, S) ∈ αaZ× αbZ× R such that −
(1
2 + η
a
)
αa < S − Sa <
(1
2 + η
a
)
αa
)
.
and −
(1
2 + η
b
)
αb < S − Sb <
(1
2 + η
b
)
αb
}
by
h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) = sup
`∈Lt
Et,Sa,Sb,S,q
[
QT (ST − AQT ) +
∫ T
t
{
Sasλ(`as)− Sbsλ(`bs)
− φQ2s − φ−Q2s1Qs<0
}
ds
]
,
(3.2)
where Lt denotes the restriction of admissible controls to [t, T ]. We define the boundary ∂D of D as
∂D =
{
(Sa, Sb, S) ∈ αaZ× αbZ× R such that S − Sa = ±
(1
2 + η
a
)
αa and/or S − Sb = ±
(1
2 + η
b
)
αb.
}
,
and write D¯ = D ∪ ∂D. For given (Sa, Sb), if (Sa, Sb, S) ∈ ∂D, it means that S corresponds to an
efficient price value that triggers a modification of the fair bid or ask price.
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The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to this stochastic control problem is given by
0 =∂th(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)− φq2 − φ−q21q<0 + 12σ
2∂SSh(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
Sa + h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q − `a)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
(−Sb) + h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q + `b)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
), (3.3)
for (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ [0, T )×D ×Q, with terminal condition
h(T, Sa, Sb, S, q) = q(S − Aq). (3.4)
Let us consider the function h defined in 3.2. For (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ [0, T )×∂D×Q, and (tn, San, Sbn, Sn, qn)n∈N
a sequence in [0, T )×D ×Q which converges to (t, Sa, Sb, S, q), we will show that h(tn, San, Sbn, Sn, qn)
converges independently of the sequence and we denote by h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) its limit. On [0, T )×∂D×Q,
we will show the following boundary conditions (which we will naturally impose for the solution of 3.3):
0 = 1{S−Sa=( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb<( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa + αa, Sb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ 1{S−Sa<( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa, Sb + αb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ 1{S−Sa=( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa + αa, Sb + αb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ 1{S−Sa=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb>−( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa − αa, Sb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ 1{S−Sa>−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=−( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa, Sb − αb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ 1{S−Sa=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=−( 12+ηb)αb}
(
h(t, Sa − αa, Sb − αb, S, q)− h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
.
(3.5)
In other words, the value function varies continuously when the efficient price leaves an uncertainty
zone and the prices Sa and Sb are modified.4 In the following, we say that a function defined on
[0, T )×D ×Q satisfies the continuity conditions if it satisfies (3.5).
The following proposition is of particular importance for the existence and uniqueness of a viscosity
solution associated to the control problem of the market maker.
4Note that, as the terminal condition does not depend on Sa and Sb, it also satisfies this boundary condition on ∂D.
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Proposition 3.2. The function h defined in Equation (3.2) is continuous on D and satisfies the
continuity conditions (3.5).
The proof is given in Appendix A.1 and relies on the specific structure of our model based on hitting
times of a Brownian motion. We now state the main theorem of this article, whose proof is relegated
to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. The value function h is the unique continuous viscosity solution to Equation (3.3) on
[0, T )×D ×Q with terminal condition (3.4) and satisfying the continuity conditions.
The value function depends on five variables. However, as (Sa, Sb) takes value in αaN × αbN, it can
essentially be reduced to three variables as we now explain. For any (i, j) ∈ N2, we introduce the
function hi,j defined on
[0, T ]×
(
αai− (12 + η
a)αa, αai+ (12 + η
a)αa
)
∩
(
αbj − (12 + η
b)αb, αbj + (12 + η
b)αb
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Di,j
×Q
by hi,j(t, S, q) = h(t, αai, αbj, S, q). Then hi,j is the solution of the following HJB equation:
0 =∂thi,j(t, S, q)− φq2 − φ−(q)2−1q<0 +
1
2σ
2∂SSh
i,j(t, S, q)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
αai+ hi,j(t, S, q − `a)− hi,j(t, S, q)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
− αbj + hi,j(t, S, q + `b)− hi,j(t, S, q)
),
with terminal condition hi,j(T, S, q) = q(S − AQ) and natural Dirichlet boundary conditions for S ∈
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∂Di,j :
hi,j(t, S, q) = hi+1,j(t, S, q)1{S−αai=( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj<( 12+ηb)αb}
+ hi,j+1(t, S, q)1{S−αai<( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj=( 12+ηb)αb}
+ hi+1,,j+1(t, S, q)1{S−αai=( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj=( 12+ηb)αb}
+ hi−1,j(t, S, q)1{S−αai=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj>−( 12+ηb)αb}
+ hi,j−1(t, S, q)1{S−αai>−( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj=−( 12+ηb)αb}
+ hi−1,j−1(t, S, q)1{S−αai=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−αbj=−( 12+ηb)αb}.
From this, we derive the optimal controls of the market maker as
`?a(t, i, j, S, q) = 1{αai+hi,j(t,S,q−1)−hi,j(t,S,q)>0},
`?b(t, i, j, S, q) = 1{−αbj+hi,j(t,S,q+1)−hi,j(t,S,q)>0}.
The practical interest of Theorem 1 is that it allows us to compute the value function and optimal
controls based on a finite difference scheme. Examples of computations of the value function are given
in Section 4 and Appendix A.3. Having described the problem of the market maker, we now turn to
the optimization problem of the platform.
3.2 The platform’s problem
The market maker acts on a platform whose goal is to maximize the number of market orders on [0, T ].
The intensities of arrival of market orders are functions of `a, `b, which are themselves functions of
αa, αb. We assume that the platform is risk-neutral and earns a fixed taker cost c > 0 for each market
order.5 Therefore its optimization problem is defined as
sup
(αa,αb)∈R2+
El?a,l?b
[
XpT
]
,
5More complex fee schedules can be handled in this framework. We can for example add a component which is
proportional to the amount of cash traded.
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given the optimal controls (l?a, l?b) of the market maker and Xpt = c(Nat +N bt ).
It is easy to observe that this problem boils down to maximizing the function v defined below over R2+:
v(αa, αb) := E
[∫ T
0
cλ
{
`?a(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt)
1 + (καa)2 +
`?b(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt)
1 + (καb)2
}
dt
]
.
Here we clearly see the tradeoff of the platform. A small tick size αa increase the term (1 + (καa)2)−1.
This is because it attracts more buy market orders. However, the optimal control `?,a is more often
equal to zero: the gain of the market maker may be too small if he quotes at the price Sa, therefore
he regularly sets `?,a = 0. The problem is similar on the bid side. On the other hand, a large tick size
increases the gain of the market maker if a transaction occurs, but decreases the number of market
orders sent by market takers, hence decreasing the trading volume.
We study numerically this problem in the next section by computing the value of v on a two dimensional
grid and finding its maximum.
4 Numerical results
In this section, we show from numerical experiments the benefits of side-specific tick values in terms
of increase of their value function for both the market maker and the platform. Also, we fix reference
values η0 and α0. From them, to choose the parameter ηi associated to a given tick size αi we use a
result from [10] which gives the new value of the parameter ηi in case of a change of tick size from α0
to αi. This formula writes
ηi = η0
√
α0
αi
. (4.1)
In the following, we only consider values of αa and αb such that the underlying remains a large tick
asset both on the bid and ask sides, that is ηa ≤ 12 , ηb ≤ 12 .
For the first experiments, we set T = 40s, q = 5, σ = 0.01s−1, A = 0.1, κ = 10, φ = 0.005, λ = 4,
η0 = 0.3 and α0 = 0.01 which correspond to reasonable values to model a liquid asset. To remain in
13
the large tick regime, we investigate values of αi satisfying 0.0045 ≤ αi ≤ 0.05 for i = a, b.
4.1 Similar tick values on both sides
In this section we investigate the case where αa = αb. We plot in Figure 1 the value functions of the
market maker and the exchange, respectively h and v, for various values of α = αa = αb. We fix the
efficient price S = 10.5, the inventory q = 0 and we only consider values of α so that 0.5/α ∈ N.
Figure 1: Value function h (on the left) and v (on the right) for φ− = 0 in blue, φ− = 0.0005 in orange,
φ− = 0.005 in green, as a function of α = αa = αb.
When φ− = 0, the value of the exchange reaches its maximum at α ' 0.012. An increase of φ− leads
to a reduction of the number of transactions. However the optimal tick value for the exchange is not
significantly modified.
The optimal tick value for the market maker is larger than that of the exchange. This is because the
exchange is only interested in attracting orders while the market maker’s gain per trade (not taking
into account the inventory risk) is linear with respect to the tick value. The trade-off of the exchange is
the following: on the one hand, he would like to implement a quite small tick value (to attract market
orders) but on the other hand, he must ensure a reasonable presence of market maker.
When φ− increases, the value function of the market maker decreases, for all tick values. This is no
surprise since φ− corresponds to an inventory penalization, hence reducing the market maker’s PnL.
In Figure 2, we substract the value function when φ− = 0 to the other value functions displayed in
Figure 1. We remark that for the market maker, the larger the tick the more significant the penalization
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of short inventory in terms of value function. We observe the opposite phenomenon for the exchange:
the difference is essentially slightly increasing with respect to α. In particular, we see a quite strong
impact of the penalization on the value function of the exchange when the tick size is small.
Figure 2: Variation of the functions h and v (difference between φ− = 0 in blue, φ− = 0.0005 in orange,
φ− = 0.005 in green, and φ− = 0 as a function of α = αa = αb.
We now study the case of side-specific tick values.
4.2 Side-specific tick values: additional opportunities for the market maker
We set αb = 0.0124 (optimal tick size in the non side-specific case) and let αa vary. We plot the
value functions of the market maker and the exchange in Figure 3. Again we observe that both value
Figure 3: Value function h (on the left) and v (on the right) as functions of αa, for αb = 0.0124, for
φ− = 0 in blue, φ− = 0.0005 in orange, φ− = 0.005 in green.
functions are decreasing with respect to φ−. From the point of view of the market maker, having non
side-specific tick values is sub-optimal, even in the case φ− = 0. This is because when the two tick values
are different, it is possible for Sa to be greater than Sb and orders to arrive with the same intensities
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on both sides: the market maker can collect the spread. It is not possible in the non side-specific case,
where the market maker can only pocket the spread from buy and sell orders at two different times.
Side-specific tick values are also clearly beneficial for the exchange. The transaction flow increases for
αa > αb because of the good liquidity provided by the market maker, and for αa < αb because of the
high number of incoming market orders.
Remark 4.1. Remark that with shifted grids (same tick values on both sides but with a grid shifted
compared to the other), those additional opportunities for the market maker would remain. In section
4.3, we will see however, that, from the point of view of the exchange, side-specific tick values are much
more interesting.
4.3 Side-specific tick values: effect of φ−
We plot the two-dimensional value functions of the market maker and the exchange for side-specific
tick values.
First we take φ− = 0 in Figure 4. We note that the opportunity for the market maker mentioned above
remains present for all tick values and that the value functions are symmetric around the axis αb = αa
(side-specific tick values are preferred). Furthermore, we see that the exchange prefers smaller tick
values than the market maker. The optimal values for the exchange lie on an anti-diagonal which goes
from (αa = 0.0045, αb = 0.025) to (αa = 0.025, αb = 0.0045). On this line the number of transactions
varies little. It seems however that the optimum is on the edges of the zone in which the asset remains
large tick: the two couples (αa, αb) mentioned above.
If the tick values are too large the intensities of the market orders become too small and the number
of transactions diminishes. If both ticks are too small, the market maker does not trade much because
the gain per trade becomes too little compared to the inventory cost (recall that the intensity of market
orders is upper bounded). However, the case where one tick is quite small and the other is large is
suitable for the market maker: for example, if αa < αb his strategy is to be long and liquidate his
long position fast if needed thanks to the small value of αa which ensures a large number of incoming
market orders. This explains why the optimal tick values given by the exchange are side-specific and
symmetric with respect to the axis αa = αb. More precisely, the choice of ticks (αa = 0.0045, αb = 0.025)
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or (αa = 0.025, αb = 0.0045) seems optimal.
Figure 4: Value function h (on the left) and v (on the right) as functions of αa and αb, for φ− = 0.
We now plot in Figure 5 the value function for φ− = 0.005. This non-zero parameter implies a clear
decrease of the value function of the market maker and the reduction of the number of transactions.
An important remark is that the value functions are no-longer symmetric around the axis αb = αa.
Figure 5: Value function h (on the left) and v (on the right) as functions of αa and αb, for φ− = 0.005.
For clarity we plot in Figure 6 the difference of the value functions when φ− = 0.005 and when φ− = 0 as
a function of αa, αb. We see that the added component is not symmetric regarding to the axis αb = αa
and both the market maker and the exchange tend to prefer the case αb > αa. It is particularly clear for
the market maker’s problem where the difference between the values at (αa = 0.0045, αb = 0.025) and
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Figure 6: Difference between the value function h (on the left) and v (on the right) as functions of αa
and αb, between the case φ− = 0.005 and the case φ− = 0.
(αa = 0.025, αb = 0.0045) is approximately 0.03 which is roughly 10% of the value function. Indeed, as
explained above, having αb quite large and αa rather small essentially ensures that the market maker
can maintain a positive inventory all along the trading trajectory: attractive PnL for incoming buy
orders and possibility to quickly reduce a positive inventory.
The exchange is also more satisfied by the choice αb > αa. To see that more clearly, we fix αa = 0.0045
and plot in Figure 7 the value functions h and v, as functions of αb, for different values of φ.
Figure 7: Value functions h and v for αa = 0.0045, as functions of αb, for different values of φ.
The value function of the market maker is increasing in αb. This is the same phenomenon as already
observed in Figure 5. The value of the exchange has a maximum which is increasing in φ−: as the
penalization gets more side-specific, the optimal tick values displayed by the exchange become more
asymmetric. Indeed, for φ− = 0, the optimum is reached for αb ' 0.024, while for φ− = 0.005, it is
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obtained for αb ' 0.034. Note that a relevant tick value set by the exchange can compensate for his
loss of value function due to an increase of φ−. By choosing a new tick size optimally when going from
φ− = 0 to φ− = 0.005, the loss in value function is of 7% only. Keeping αb = 0.024 would lead to a loss
of 15%. Note that the compensation can be total for the market maker (and even exceeds the loss)
but is only partial for the exchange.
5 Conclusion
A suitable choice of tick values by the exchange is a subtle equilibrium. If the platform imposes the
same tick value on the bid and ask sides, it has to be sufficiently large to ensure significant PnL per
trade for the market maker and therefore good liquidity provision, and sufficiently small to attract
market orders from market takers. When allowing for side-specific tick values with no constraint on
short inventory, the optimal tick values for the exchange are of the form (α?1, α?2) or symmetrically
(α?2, α?1) with α?1 < α?2. In this case, the market maker can take advantage from additional trading
opportunities and increase his activity. The exchange benefits from this situation because of the higher
number of trades on his platform. Moreover, when there is a penalty for short inventory positions
of the market maker, there is only one optimal couple of tick values. In this case, the market maker
and subsequently the exchange prefer αb > αa and the difference between αa and αb at the optimum
becomes larger. Finally, note that side-specific tick values could have subtle consequences in a multi-
platform setting. This issue is left for further study, as well as the situation where market takers are
more strategic in their execution.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
First we prove the continuity of h on D × [0, T ).
Let q ∈ Q, t1 ∈ [0, T ), (sa, sb, s1) ∈ D. Note that {s ∈ R, (sa, sb, s) ∈ D} is an open interval containing
s1, which we denote by (s←, s→). If the process St starts from a point s ∈ (s←, s→) with Sat = sa and
Sbt = sb, Sat and Sbt will not jump as long as St stays in (s←, s→). We will prove that the function
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(t, s) ∈ [0, T )× (s←, s→) 7→ h(t, sa, sb, s, q) is continuous at (t1, s1).
We fix η > 0. There is a ball with positive diameter B in [0, T ) × (s←, s→) centered on (t1, s1) and
some  > 0 such that, if (t2, s2) ∈ B, then
E[τ 1 − t1|St1 = s1] < η, E[τ 2 − t2|St2 = s2] < η, (A.1)
P[τ 1 < T |St1 = s1] > 1− η, P[τ 2 < T |St2 = s2] > 1− η, (A.2)
and6
inf
`∈L
P[ inf
t1≤s≤τ1
Qs = sup
t1≤s≤τ1
Qs = q|St1 = s1, Qt1 = q] > 1− η,
inf
`∈L
P[ inf
t2≤s≤τ2
Qs = sup
t2≤s≤τ2
Qs = q|St2 = s2, Qt2 = q] > 1− η,
(A.3)
where we write
τ 1 = T ∧ inf{t ≥ t1, St1,s1t = (s1 ∨ s2) +  or St1,s1t = (s1 ∧ s2)− },
τ 2 = T ∧ inf{t ≥ t2, St2,s2t = (s1 ∨ s2) +  or St2,s2t = (s1 ∧ s2)− }.
The quantities τ 1 and τ 2 are stopping times such that t1 ≤ τ 1 ≤ T a.s. and t2 ≤ τ 2 ≤ T a.s. We
impose
s← < (s1 ∧ s2)−  < s1 < (s1 ∨ s2) +  < s→, s← < (s1 ∧ s2)−  < s2 < (s1 ∨ s2) +  < s→
for any (t2, s2) ∈ B by taking a smaller ball B and a smaller  if necessary. In particular, this tells us
that if (St1 , Sat1 , Sbt1) = (s1, sa, sb), Sat does not jump between t1 and τ 1. Similarly, if (St2 , Sat2 , Sbt2) =
(s2, sa, sb), Sbt does not jump between between t2 and τ 2 .
Let some arbitrary (t2, s2) ∈ B and τ 1 and τ 2 the associated stopping times. Using the dynamic
6These inequalities can be attained independently of the control ` as S is independent from Q.
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programming principle, we obtain
h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q) = sup
`∈L
E
[
h(τ 1,Saτ1,Sbτ1,Sτ1,Qτ1)+
∫ τ1
t1
{
−φQ2t − φ−Q2t1Qt<0
}
dt
∣∣∣∣St1 = s1, Sat1 = sa, Sbt1 = sb, Qt1 = q
]
.
This can be rewritten as
h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q) = sup
`∈L
E
[ ∑
q¯∈Q
(
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q¯)1{Qτ1=q¯}+
∫ τ1
t1
{
−φQ2t − φ−Q2t1Qt<0
}
1{Qt=q¯}
)
dt
∣∣∣St1 =s1, Qt1 =q
]
.
Recalling that h is bounded, we deduce by A.3 that
∣∣∣∣∣h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q)− sup`∈LE
[
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q) +
∫ τ1
t1
{
−φq2 − φ−(q)2−
}
dt
∣∣∣St1 = s1, Qt1 = q]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cη
for a constant C, independent from (t1, t2, s1, s2), and (q)− = q21q<0. The expectation above does not
depend on the control `, hence we drop the supremum and fix an arbitrary control ` = 0. We denote
by E0 the expectation under the probability measure given by this control. The expectation neither
depends on the process Qt, so we drop the conditioning with respect to Qt1 .
This leads to
∣∣∣∣∣h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q)− E0
[
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q) +
∫ τ1
t1
{
−φq2 − φ−(q)2−
}
dt
∣∣∣St1 = s1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cη.
Similarly, starting from (t2, sa, sb, s2, q) with (t2, s2) ∈ B, we get
∣∣∣∣∣h(t2, sa, sb, s2, q)− E0
[
h(τ 2, sa, sb, Sτ2 , q) +
∫ τ2
t2
{
−φq2 − φ−(q)2−
}
dt
∣∣∣St2 = s2]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cη,
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and we deduce that
|h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q)− h(t2, sa, sb, s2, q)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣E0
[
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q) +
∫ τ1
t1
{
−φq2 − φ−(q)2−
}
dt|St1 = s1
]
− E0
[
h(τ 2, sa, sb, Sτ2 , q) +
∫ τ2
t2
{
−φq2 − φ−(q)2−
}
dt|St2 = s2
]∣∣∣∣∣+ 2Cη
≤
∣∣∣∣∣E0
[
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q)|St1 = s1
]
− E0
[
h(τ 2, sa, sb, Sτ2 , q)|St2 = s2
]∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣φq2 − φ−(q)2−∣∣∣∣(E0[τ 1 − t1|St1 = s1]+ E0[τ 2 − t2|St2 = s2])+ 2Cη.
(A.4)
Using (A.1), we get
∣∣∣∣E0[τ 1 − t1|St1 = s1]+ E0[τ 2 − t2|St2 = s2]∣∣∣∣ < 2η. (A.5)
Also, the conditional laws
(
τ 1|St1 = s1, Sτ1 = (s1 ∨ s2) + , τ 1 < T
)
,
(
τ 1|St1 = s1, Sτ1 = (s1 ∧ s2)− , τ 1 < T
)
,(
τ 2|St2 = s2, Sτ2 = (s1 ∨ s2) + , τ 2 < T
)
,
(
τ 2|St2 = s2, Sτ2 = (s1 ∧ s2)− , τ 2 < T
)
,
have bounded continuous densities, which we denote by f 1,+, f 1,−, f 2,+ and f 2,− respectively (see for
example [5], Formula 3.0.6). So, by decomposing the first term in (A.4) with respect to the values of
Sτ1 and Sτ2 , we can write
∣∣∣∣∣E0
[
h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q)|St1 = s1
]
− E0
[
h(τ 2, sa, sb, Sτ2 , q)|St2 = s2
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈{+,−}
∫ T
0
h(t, sa, sb, sj, q)(f 1,j(t)P0[Sτ1 = sj, τ 1 < T |St1 = s1]− f 2,j(t)P0[Sτ2 = sj, τ 2 < T |St2 = s2])dt
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣E0[h(τ 1, sa, sb, Sτ1 , q)1{Sτ1 6=s+,Sτ1 6=s−}∪{τ1=T}|St1 = s1]
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣E0[h(τ 2, sa, sb, Sτ2 , q)1{Sτ2 6=s+,Sτ2 6=s−}∪{τ2=T}|St2 = s2]
∣∣∣∣
(A.6)
where s+ = s1 ∨ s2 +  and s− = s1 ∧ s2 − . Remark that the event Sτ1 6= s+, Sτ1 6= s−, St1 = s1
happens only if τ 1 = T so that P0[{Sτ1 6= s+, Sτ1 6= s−} ∪ {τ 1 = T}|St1 = s1] < η by (A.2). Similarly
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P0[{Sτ2 6= s+, Sτ2 6= s−}∪{τ 2 = T}|St2 = s2] < η by (A.2). As a consequence, using again (A.4), (A.5)
and the fact that h is bounded, we get
∣∣∣h(t1, sa, sb, s1, q)− h(t2, sa, sb, s2, q)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈{+,−}
∫
h(t, sa, sb, sj, q)(f 1,j(t)P0[Sτ1 = sj, τ 1 < T |St1 = s1]− f 2,j(t)P0[Sτ2 = sj, τ 2 < T |St2 = s2])dt
∣∣∣∣
+ (2|φq2 − φ−(q)2−|+ 4C)η.
Recall that the f 1,+, f 1,−, f 2,+ and f 2,− depend on s2 and t2. We have
|P0[Sτ2 = s+, τ 2 < T |St2 = s2]f 2,+ − P0[Sτ1 = s+, τ 1 < T |St1 = s1]f 1,+| →(t2,s2)→(t1,s1) 0,
|P0[Sτ2 = s−, τ 2 < T |St2 = s2]f 2,− − P0[Sτ1 = s−, τ 1 < T |St1 = s1]f 1,−| →(t2,s2)→(t1,s1) 0
point-wise on [0, T ] directly by [5] Formula 3.0.6 and Appendix 11. Having fixed  and using again [5]
Formula 3.0.6 and Appendix 11, we see that the above functions are uniformly bounded with respect to
(s2, t2) ∈ B. So, using that h is bounded, we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to deduce
that
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈{+,−}
∫ T
0
h(t, sa, sb, sj, q)(f 1,j(t)P0[Sτ1 = sj, τ 1 < T |St1 = s1]− f 2,j(t)P0[Sτ2 = sj, τ 2 < T |St2 = s2])dt
∣∣∣∣
→
(t2,s2)→(t1,s1)
0.
Thus we have shown that h is continuous at the point (t1, Sa, Sb, s1, q). The case t1 = T is treated the
same way.
The continuity conditions can be proved using the same lines: fixing q ∈ Q, t1 ∈ [0, T ) and (Sa, Sb, s1) ∈
∂D, choosing (t2, s2) close enough to (t1, s1) and applying the dynamic programming principle between
t1 and τ 1, and t2 and τ 2, for τ 1 and τ 2 two well-chosen stopping times (for example
τ 1 = T ∧ inf
{
t > t1, St = s1 +  or St =
s← ∧ s1
2
}
, τ 2 = T ∧ inf
{
t > t2, St = s1 +  or St =
s← ∧ s1
2
}
.
with  > 0 small enough, for a boundary inducing an upward jump).
23
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove that the value function of the market maker’s problem is indeed a viscosity solution of
(3.3).
Proposition A.1. The value function h is a continuous viscosity solution on [0, T )×D×Q of (3.3).
Furthermore, h(T, Sa, Sb, S, q) = q(S − Aq) for all (Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ D ×Q, and
h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) =1{S−Sa=( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb<( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a + αa, Sb, S, q)
+1{S−Sa<( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a, Sb + αb, S, q)
+1{S−Sa=( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a + αa, Sb + αb, S, q)
+1{S−Sa=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb>−( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a − αa, Sb, S, q)
+1{S−Sa>−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=−( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a, Sb − αb, S, q)
+1{S−Sa=−( 12+ηa)αa, S−Sb=−( 12+ηb)αb}h(t, S
a − αa, Sb − αb, S, q),
for all (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ [0, T )× ∂D ×Q.
Proof. Let (S¯a, S¯b, q¯) ∈ αaN× αbN×Q, and (tn, Sn)n∈N ∈ [0, T ]× R be a sequence such that
tn →
n→+∞ tˆ ∈ [0, T ),
Sn →
n→+∞ Sˆ ∈ R,
h(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) →
n→+∞ h(tˆ, S¯
a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯),
with (S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ) ∈ D. Without loss of generality we can assume that (S¯a, S¯b, Sn) ∈ D for all n ∈ N.
Let us first consider the case tˆ = T . Let us take two arbitrary controls `as = `bs = 0, for all s ∈ [0, T ),
then for all n ∈ N we have
h(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) ≥ Etn,S¯a,S¯b,Sn,q¯
QT (ST − AQT )− φ ∫ T
tn
Q2sds− φ−
∫ T
tn
Q2s1Qs<0ds
,
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and by dominated convergence we can obtain
h(T, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) ≥ q¯(Sˆ − Aq¯).
Now let us consider the case tˆ < T. Let ϕ : [0, T ) × D ×Q → R be a continuous function, C1 in t, C2
in S and such that 0 = min
[0,T )×D
(h− ϕ) = (h− ϕ)(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯). We also assume that h = ϕ only at the
point (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯). Let us assume that there exists η > 0 such that
2η ≤∂tϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− φq¯2 − φ−q¯21q¯<0 + 12σ
2∂SSϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
S¯a + ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ − `a)− ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
− S¯b + ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ + `b)− ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
).
Then we must have
0 ≤∂tϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)− φq¯2 − φ−q¯21q¯<0 + 12σ
2∂SSϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
S¯a + ϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯ − `a)− ϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
− S¯b + ϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯ + `b)− ϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)
),
for all (t, S) ∈ B =
(
(tˆ− r, tˆ+ r) ∩ [0, T )
)
×
(
Sˆ − r, Sˆ + r
)
for some r > 0. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that B contains the sequence (tn, Sn)n and that for all (t, S) ∈ B, we have (S¯a, S¯b, S) ∈
D. We can choose the value of η such that
ϕ(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯) + η ≤ h(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)
on ∂pB :=
((
(tˆ− r, tˆ+ r) ∩ [0, T )
)
×
({
Sˆ − r
}
∪
{
Sˆ + r
}))
∪
(
{tˆ+r}×
[
Sˆ − r, Sˆ + r
] )
.We can also
assume that
ϕ(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) + η ≤ h(t, Sa, Sb, S, q),
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for (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ B˜ with
B˜ =
{
(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q)
∣∣∣(t, S) ∈ B, q ∈ {q¯ − 1, q¯ + 1} ∩ Q}.
We introduce the set
BD =
{
(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)
∣∣∣(t, S) ∈ B}
and set pin = inf{t ≥ tn|(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt) /∈ BD} with Sitn = S¯i, qtn = q¯, Stn = Sn, where the processes
are controlled by
`at = 1{Sat +ϕ(t,Sat ,Sbt ,St,qt−−1)−ϕ(t,Sat ,Sbt ,St,qt−)>0},
`bt = 1{−Sbt+ϕ(t,Sat ,Sbt ,St,qt−+1)−ϕ(t,Sat ,Sbt ,St,qt−)>0}.
Using Itô’s formula and noting that Sat , Sbt do not jump between tn and pin, we derive
ϕ(pin, Sapin , S
b
pin , Spin ,qpin)=ϕ(tn, S¯
a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) +
∫ pin
tn
{
∂tϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt) +
1
2σ
2∂SSϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt)
}
dt
+
∫ pin
tn
λ(`at )
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− − `at )− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dt
+
∫ pin
tn
λ(`bt)
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− + `bt)− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dt
+
∫ pin
tn
σ∂Sϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt)dWt
+
∫ pin
tn
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− − `at )− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dN˜at
+
∫ pin
tn
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− + `bt)− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dN˜ bt
≥ ϕ(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
−
∫ pin
tn
{
Sat λ(`at )− Sbtλ(`bt)− φq2t − φ−q2t 1qt<0
}
dt
+
∫ pin
tn
σ∂Sϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt)dWt
+
∫ pin
tn
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− − `at )− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dN˜at
+
∫ pin
tn
{
ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt− + `bt)− ϕ(t, Sat , Sbt , St, qt−)
}
dN˜ bt .
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Then by taking the expectation we get
ϕ(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) ≤E
[
ϕ(pin, Sapin , S
b
pin , Spin , qpin) +
∫ pin
tn
{
Sat λ(`at )− Sbtλ(`bt)− φq2t − φ−q2t 1qt<0
}
dt
]
.
Thus
ϕ(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) ≤− η + E
[
h(pin, Sapin , S
b
pin , Spin , qpin) +
∫ pin
tn
{
Sat λ(`at )− Sbtλ(`bt)− φq2t − φ−q2t 1qt<0
}
dt
]
.
As
ϕ(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) →
n→+∞ ϕ(tˆ, S¯
a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) = h(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯),
h(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) →
n→+∞ h(tˆ, S¯
a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯),
there exists n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, h(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)− η2 ≤ ϕ(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) and we deduce
h(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) ≤− η2 + E
[
h(pin, Sapin , S
b
pin , Spin , qpin) +
∫ pin
tn
{
Sat λ(`at )− Sbtλ(`bt)− φq2t − φ−q2t 1qt<0
}
dt
]
,
which contradicts the dynamic programming principle. Therefore,
0 ≥∂tϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− φq¯2 − φ−q¯21q¯<0 + 12σ
2∂SSϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
S¯a + ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ − `a)− ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
− S¯b + ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ + `b)− ϕ(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
),
and h is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB equation on [0, T )×D ×Q.
The proof for the subsolution part is identical.
For a given ρ > 0, we introduce the function h˜ such that
h˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) = eρth(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∀ (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) ∈ [0, T ]×D ×Q.
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Then h˜ is a viscosity solution of the following HJB equation:
0 =− ρh˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) + ∂th˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)− φq2 − φ−q21q<0 + 12σ
2∂SSh˜
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtSa + h˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q − `a)− h˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρt(−Sb) + h˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q + `b)− h˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)
), (A.7)
and we see that proving a maximum principle for (A.7) is equivalent to proving one for (3.3).
Definition A.2. Let U : [0, T )×D×Q → R be continuous with respect to (t, S). For (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) ∈
[0, T ) × D × Q, we say that (y, p, A) ∈ R3 is in the subjet P−U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) (resp. the superjet
P+U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)) if
U(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯) ≥ U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) + y(t− tˆ) + p(S − Sˆ) + 12A(S − Sˆ)
2 + o
(
|t− tˆ|+ |S − Sˆ|2
)
,(
resp. U(t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯) ≤ U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) + y(t− tˆ) + p(S − Sˆ) + 12A(S − Sˆ)
2 + o
(
|t− tˆ|+|S − Sˆ|2
) )
,
for all (t, S) such that (t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯) ∈ [0, T )×D ×Q.
We also define P¯−U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) as the set of points (y, p, A) ∈ R3 such that there exists a sequence
(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯, yn, pn, An) ∈ [0, T )×D ×Q×P−U(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) satisfying
(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯, yn, pn, An) →
n→+∞ (tˆ, S¯
a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯, y, p, A).
The set P¯+U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) is defined similarly.
Let us recall one of the definitions of viscosity solutions which we are going to use for the proof of the
uniqueness.
Lemma A.3. A continuous function U˜ is a viscosity supersolution (resp. subsolution) to (A.7) on
[0, T )×D×Q if and only if for all (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) ∈ [0, T )×D×Q and all (yˆ, pˆ, Aˆ) ∈ P¯−U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
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(resp. P¯+U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)), we have
− ρU˜(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) + yˆ − φq¯2 − φ−q¯21q<0 + 12σ
2A
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtS¯a + U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ − `a)− U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρt(−S¯b) + U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯ + `b)− U(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
) ≤ 0
(resp. ≥ 0).
We refer to [6] for a proof of this result. We can now state a maximum principle from which the
uniqueness can be easily deduced:
Proposition A.4. Let U (resp. V ) be a continuous viscosity supersolution (resp. subsolution) of (3.3)
with polynomial growth on [0, T )×D ×Q and satisfying the continuity conditions (3.5). If U ≥ V on
{T} × D ×Q, then U ≥ V on [0, T )×D ×Q.
Proof. As before, we introduce the functions U˜ and V˜ such that
U˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) = eρtU(t, Sa, Sb, S, q) and V˜ (t, Sa, Sb, S, q) = eρtV (t, Sa, Sb, S, q).
Then U˜ and V˜ are respectively viscosity supersolution and subsolution of Equation (A.7) on [0, T ) ×
D ×Q with U˜ ≥ V˜ on {T} × D ×Q. To prove the proposition, it is enough to prove that U˜ ≥ V˜ on
[0, T )×D×Q. We proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that sup
[0,T )×D×Q
V˜ − U˜ > 0. Let p ∈ N∗ such
that
lim
‖S‖2→+∞
sup
t∈[0,T ],q∈Q
(S,Sa,Sb)∈D
|U˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)|+ |V˜ (t, Sa, Sb, S, q)|
1 + ‖S‖2p2
= 0,
where ‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidian norm. Then there exists (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) ∈ [0, T ]×D ×Q such that
0 < V˜ (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− U˜(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− φ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ, q¯)
= sup
(t,Sa,Sb,S,q)
V˜ (t, Sa, Sb, S, q)− U˜(t, Sa, Sb, S, q)− φ(t, S, S, q),
where
φ(t, S, R, q) := εe−µt(1 + ‖S‖2p2 + ‖R‖2p2 ),
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with ε > 0, µ > 0. The choice of the function φ allows us to look for a supremum in a bounded set
with respect to (S, Sa, Sb). Then the supremum is either reached for a point in [0, T ] × D × Q or on
[0, T ]× ∂D ×Q (recall that D is open). But the continuity conditions tell us that if the supremum is
reached on [0, T ] × ∂D ×Q, it is also reached in [0, T ] × D ×Q. Since U˜ ≥ V˜ on {T} × D × Q, it is
clear that tˆ < T .
Then, for all n ∈ N∗, we can find (tn, Sn, Rn) ∈ [0, T ]×R2 such that (S¯a, S¯b, Sn), (S¯a, S¯b, Rn) ∈ D and
0 < V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯n, Sn, q¯)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
− φ(tn, Sn, Rn, q¯)− n|Sn −Rn|2 −
(
|tn − tˆ|2 + |Sn − Sˆ|4
)
= sup
(t,S,R)
V˜ (t, S¯a, S¯b, S, q¯)− U˜(t, S¯a, S¯b, R, q¯)
− φ(t, S, R, q¯)− n|S −R|2 −
(
|t− tˆ|2 + |S − Sˆ|4
)
.
Then, we have
(tn, Sn, Rn) →
n→+∞ (tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ),
and
V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
− φ(tn, Sn, Rn)− n|Sn −Rn|2 −
(
|tn − tˆ|2 + |Sn − Sˆ|4
)
→
n→+∞ V˜ (tˆ, S¯
a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− U˜(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− φ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ).
For n ∈ N∗, let us write for (t, S, R) ∈ [0, T ]× R2
ϕn(t, S, R) := φ(t, S, R) + n|S −R|2 + |t− tˆ|2 + |S − Sˆ|4.
Then Ishii’s Lemma (see [4, 9]) guarantees that for any η > 0, we can find
(y1n, p1n, A1n) ∈ P¯+V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯) and (y2n, p2n, A2n) ∈ P¯−U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯) such that
y1n − y2n = ∂tϕn(tn, Sn, Rn), (p1n, p2n) = (∂Sϕn,−∂Rϕn) (tn, Sn, Rn)
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and A1n 0
0 −A2n
 ≤ HSRϕn(tn, Sn, Rn) + η (HSRϕn(tn, Sn, Rn))2 ,
where HSRϕn(tn, ., .) denotes the Hessian of ϕn(tn, ., .). Applying Lemma A.3, we get
ρ
(
V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
)
≤ y1n − y2n +
1
2σ
2(A1n − A2n)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtnS¯a + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ − `a)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρtn(−S¯b) + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ + `b)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
)
− λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtnS¯a + U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯ − `a)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
)
− λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρtn(−S¯b) + U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯ + `b)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
).
Moreover, we have
HSRϕn(tn, Sn, Rn) =
∂2SSφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2n+ 12(Sn − Sˆ)2 ∂2SRφ(tn, Sn, Rn)− 2n
∂2SRφ(tn, Sn, Rn)− 2n ∂2SRφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2n
 .
It follows that
ρ
(
V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
)
≤ ∂tφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2(tn − tˆ)
+ 12σ
2
(
∂2SSφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + ∂2RRφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2∂2SRφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 12(Sn − Sˆ)
)
+ ηCn
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtnS¯a + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ − `a)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρtn(−S¯b) + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ + `b)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
)
− λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtnS¯a + U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯ − `a)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
)
− λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρtn(−S¯b) + U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯ + `b)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
),
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where Cn does not depend on η. Therefore, as the maximums on the right-hand side are always positive,
we deduce that for all n ∈ N∗,
ρ
(
V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)− U˜(tn, S¯a, S¯b, Rn, q¯)
)
≤ ∂tφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2(tn − tˆ)
+ 12σ
2
(
∂2SSφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + ∂2RRφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 2∂2SRφ(tn, Sn, Rn) + 12(Sn − Sˆ)
)
+ λ1 + (καa)2 max`a∈{0,1}
`a
(
eρtnS¯a + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ − `a)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
)
+ λ1 + (καb)2 max`b∈{0,1}
`b
(
eρtn(−S¯b) + V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯ + `b)− V˜ (tn, S¯a, S¯b, Sn, q¯)
).
As V˜ is continuous and (tn, Sn)n converges to (tˆ, Sˆ), the last two terms are bounded from above by
some constant M. Then by sending n to infinity, we get
ρ
(
V˜ (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) −U˜(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)
)
≤ ∂tφ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ)
+ 12σ
2
(
∂2SSφ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ) + ∂2RRφ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ) + 2∂2SRφ(tˆ, Sˆ, Sˆ)
)
+M.
For µ > 0 large enough, the right-hand side is strictly negative, and as ρ > 0 we get
V˜ (tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯)− U˜(tˆ, S¯a, S¯b, Sˆ, q¯) < 0,
hence the contradiction.
A.3 Effects of the uncertainty zones on h
We keep the same parameters as in Section 4 and take αa = 0.01 and αb = 0.00625. We plot the value
function of the market maker’s problem (the function h) on some small range of values of S. Note that
S = 10.5 is on both discrete grids. We distinguish 4 possible cases, depending on whether
• Sa = αa bS/αac and Sb = αb
⌊
S/αb
⌋
(green dots),
• Sa = αa bS/αac and Sb = αb
⌈
S/αb
⌉
(red dash-dots),
• Sa = αa dS/αae and Sb = αb
⌊
S/αb
⌋
(orange dash),
• Sa = αa dS/αae and Sb = αb
⌈
S/αb
⌉
(blue solid).
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Figure 8: Value function h of the market maker for q = 0, as a function of S.
Note that depending on the value of S, some of those cases can be excluded. The solid vertical red
and black lines represent respectively the values on the ask (αaN) and the bid grid (αbN). The dotted
vertical lines represent the limits of the uncertainty zones on each side.
In the uncertainty zones, the value function h depends non-trivially on Sa and Sb. Thanks to the
continuity conditions at the boundaries of the uncertainty zones, we get a smooth behavior of h when
S exits a zone. Remark that when S ∈ [10± ((12 − ηa)αa) ∧ ((12 − ηb)αb)], necessarily Sa = Sb = 10.
In our example, αa > αb and (12 − ηa)αa > (12 − ηb)αb. So, if S is in (10 + (12 − ηb)αb, (12 − ηa)αa),
necessarily Sa = 10, but Sb can take either the value 10 or 10+αb depending on whether S comes from
higher prices or lower prices. This is why there are two curves in the interval (10+(12−ηb)αb, (12−ηa)αa).
At (12 − ηa)αa, two additional curves appear as Sa can also be two different values.
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